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Publications:

  • An Enriched Model of Strategic Voting under Uncertainty, S. Destercke, and H. Surugue

  • On Iterative Plurality Outcomes, V. Mousseau,  H. Surugue, M. Tydrichova, and  A. Wilczynski

  • Probabilistic Approaches to the Analysis of Voting Outcomes' Variability (PhD thesis),  H. Surugue (December 2025)

  • Agreement among Voting Rules under Single-Peaked Preference Distributions V. Mousseau, H. Surugue, and A. Wilczynski, in Proceedings of the 28th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2025)

  • Do we care about poll manipulation in political elections? V. Mousseau, H. Surugue, and A. Wilczynski, in Proceedings of the 27th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence (ECAI 2024)

Topic of interests:

  • Tree-Based Structures in Elections 

  • ​Toward a fair and explainable schedule allocation

  • Iterative Fair Allocation  ​

  • Analysis of the River Voting Method

Seminars:

  • LACL's Seminar, UPEC, Créteil, France - "Should we care about the choice of a Voting Procedure?".

  • SMA Team Meeting, LIP6 Sorbonne University, Paris, France - “A Probabilistic Approach to Decision Problems in Computational Social Choice”.

  • Game theory’s seminar, Henri Poincare’s institute, Paris, France – “Agreement among Voting Rules under Single-Peaked Preference Distributions” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • Heudiasyc's seminar, UTC, Compiegne, France – "Agreement among Voting Rules under Single-Peaked Preference Distributions"(Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • Doctoral consortium ECAI 2024, Santiago de Compostela, Spain - presentation of my thesis with a spotlight and a poster

  • Youth Researchers Days, Dauphine’s doctoral school, Normandy, France – “Probabilistic tools in Computational Social Choice and Game Theory: a broad introduction and concrete examples”.

  • Game theory’s seminar, Henri Poincare’s institute, Paris, France – “Do we care about poll manipulation in political elections?” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • Youth researcher seminar, CEREMADE at Dauphine-PSL University, Paris, France – A short introduction to computational social choice and poll manipulation in voting theory. 

  • Team seminar, MICS CentraleSupélec, Gif-sur-Yvette, France - “Do we care about poll manipulation in political elections?” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

Conferences:

  • ROADEF 2026, Tours, France – “An Enriched Model of Strategic Voting under Uncertainty” (Joint work with Sébastien Destercke).

  • COMSOC 2025, Vienne, Autriche– “On Iterative Voting Outcomes in Plurality Elections” (Joint work with Vincent Mousseau Magdalena Tydrichova and Anaëlle Wilczynski)

  • ​COMSOC 2025, Vienne, Autriche– “Agreement among Voting Rules under Single-Peaked Preference Distributions” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).  

  • PFIA 2025, Dijon, France – “Accord entre Règles de Vote sous des Distributions de Préférences Single-Peaked” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • ROADEF 2025, Marne-la-Vallée, France – “Agreement among Voting Rules under Single-Peaked Preference Distributions” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • ECAI 2024, Santiago de Compostela, Spain - “Do we care about poll manipulation in political elections?” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

  • ROADEF 2024, Amiens, France – “Do we care about poll manipulation in political elections?” (Joint work with Anaëlle Wilczynski and Vincent Mousseau).

Visiting:

  • Heudiasyc laboratory for a week (CNRS youth researcher grant), Compiegne, France - "Iterative voting under uncertainty" with Sébastien Destercke.

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